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ABSTRACT 
Michal Brzezicki: Nationalism, Sovereignty, Space, and Violence 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
In examining the relationship between nationalism and violence, this thesis seeks to 
examine a measurable relationship between violence and nationalism. It proposes a theoretical 
framework of nationalism as a relationship between national identity, the state, and violence, and 
distinguishes between its two dominant competing forms: ethno-nationalism and state-
nationalism. This paper analyzes how ethno-nationalist and state-nationalist identities/platforms 
have competed against each other in contemporary Russia, and examines how nationalist 
violence and the “monopoly on violence” have affected, or been affected by, this contest. It finds 
that a rise in the popularity and relative “strength” of ethno-nationalism correlates with weaker 
state “ownership” or control over violence, and respective increases in ethno-nationalist 
violence. Conversely, it demonstrates that a rise in the popularity and relative “strength” of state-
nationalism is reflected in more secure state “ownership” or control over violence, and correlates 
with measurable decreases in ethno-nationalist violence. This is consistent with the prediction of 
a measurable relationship between nationalism and violence, and presents new approaches to 
analyzing nationalism and nationalist contests.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between nationalism and violence has been a popular subject of debate 
among political scientists for decades. Many have tried establish a unified, comprehensive theory 
on this relationship, and the result has been many different competing theories. Since nationalism 
first succeeded communism as the object of Western political fascination in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, political scientists recognized the existence of a clear affinity between nationalism 
and violence. Yet there is anything but a consensus in the field as to how, why, or even if 
nationalism is inherently linked to violence—or whether certain types of nationalism exhibit this 
relationship more than others. Explanations and theories range wildly: from faulty leadership, to 
human psychology, emotional irrationality, to various arguments which assert either that 
nationalism motivates violence, or violence itself begets nationalism. Clearly, attempting to 
define a comprehensive relationship that governs the multitude of ways in which nationalism 
causes—or is affected by—violence is a theoretical and philosophical Gordian knot. This does 
not mean however, that there is no value in examining the relationship between nationalism and 
violence in the context of limited, well-defined circumstances and parameters. Doing so can 
allow us to test whether certain types of relationships between nationalism and violence exist at 
all. 
 To that end, the broader question which this thesis concerns itself with, is whether or not 
violence has a measurable relationship with nationalism. To identify such a role, it is necessary 
to analyze a situation where we can definitively measure both changes in nationalism and 
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changes in violence, thereby comparing the two and examining how one might affect, interact, or 
correlate with the other. The simplest such comparison that immediately comes to mind is 
comparing measures of the popularity of nationalism to the prevalence of nationalist violence—
such a broad and weakly defined comparison is unrealistic of course, but it is a useful basis for 
framing the parameters of our theory and analysis. There are different “types” of nationalism, 
and the popularity of “nationalism” in a society is less a measure of overall nationalist sentiment, 
but rather the relative strength or popularity of certain concepts of “nationalism” and national 
identity—concepts and identities which compete with one another, and are generally associated 
with various types and degrees of violence. What this paper seeks to do is to analyze the role of 
violence within a case of “nationalist contest”—or more specifically, whether violence can be 
measured and predicted against the fluctuating popularity/strength of state-nationalism vs ethno-
nationalism in contemporary Russia. This paper establishes a theoretical framework which posits 
a limited, structural role for violence within nationalist contest, provides a historical literature 
review of the contest between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism in contemporary Russia, 
and analyzes data on violence, measures of “state-nationalism”, and measures of “ethno-
nationalism” in Russia in order to determine how violence might be related/central to this 
phenomenon. 
Methodology 
In order to measure a relationship between nationalism and violence, the scope of the 
research question was narrowed down to three measurable concepts: ethno-nationalism, state-
nationalism, and violence. The case chosen for study was Russia (due to the greater degree of 
research and data available on Russian nationalism and violence), and the time-period (post-
Soviet) was chosen in order to observe a contemporary political dynamic. The process of 
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researching and developing this thesis consisted of a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods. First, qualitative research on ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism was used to 
develop the theory which structures the later analysis. Further qualitative research on the history 
of Russian nationalist politics and analysis of literature on Russian nationalist violence since 
1991 was conducted and used to construct the historical case analysis on Russian nationalism as 
seen in Chapter’s 3 and 4. The timeline chosen for this part of the analysis only extended up to 
2014, the reason being that more recent events since Russia’s annexation of Crimea have yet to 
be as thoroughly researched and written about as the events during and prior to 2014.  
Quantitative research methods were used for the data analysis as seen in Chapter 5. The 
data used in this analysis came from two sources: the SOVA Center’s database on nationalist 
violence and state suppression of said violence in Russia, and various public opinion polls 
conducted by the Levada-Center polling organization. Due to the fact that the SOVA Center’s 
data on nationalist violence only began measuring said violence since 2007, the data and 
information on ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism compiled for this analysis was primarily 
restricted to that which covered a similar period of time (2007-2018). Specific issues concerning 
the reliability of the SOVA Center 
Since ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism refer to a collection of opinions, political 
stances, and sentiments, measuring their relative “strength” or popularity required identifying 
polling data which we could associate with said positions, while simultaneously covering the 
general timeline of 2007-2018. The Levada-Center database of polling publications available 
online was searched in order to find and identify polling data which fit these criteria. These polls 
were then translated from Russian to English. Due to the wide variety of polling methods, 
population sizes, questionnaire structures, and slight deviations in polling timelines, a 
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conventional statistical/regression analysis of the data was unfeasible, therefore it was decided to 
collate and compile the data along a yearly basis and create a series of graphs with which to 
perform a comparative analysis. The data and subsequent graphs were grouped into three 
sections: violence, state-nationalism, and ethno-nationalism.  
Figures 1.1-1.3 cover measurements of nationalist violence and state of nationalist 
violence between 2007-2018 gathered by SOVA Center. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are based on the 
same collection of data, with Figure 1.1 showing the total recorded levels of violence and Figure 
1.2 breaking it down by the origin or type of victims targeted by said violence. Figure 1.3 covers 
the yearly sentencing rates by the Russian government for crimes committed by nationalist 
(primarily ethno-nationalist) individuals or organizations, including acts of violence, vandalism, 
illegal organization, and illegal propaganda.  
Figures 2.1-2.6 cover measurements associated with state-nationalism or its popularity 
during roughly the same period (there is some slight deviation in certain graphs) as gathered in 
polls conducted by Levada-Center. Figure 2.1 covers public approval ratings of Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Government as a whole between 2007-2018. Figure 
2.2 measures Russian pride, showing poll responses to the questions, “Are you currently proud 
of Russia?” and, “Are you proud to live in Russia?” between 2006-2017. Figure 2.3 measures 
public responses to the question, “What does it mean to be a patriot?” between 2007-2017, 
broken down into 8 possible responses. Figure 2.4 measures the number of positive responses to 
the question, “Does Russia currently have enemies?” between 2008 and 2017. Figure 2.5 
measures the number of respondents who stated that they had a positive opinion of the United 
States or the European Union, between 2007 and 2018. Figure 2.6 measures the percentage of 
respondents who listed Ukraine, Lithuania, or Poland among the top 5 countries they saw as 
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most hostile or unfriendly to Russia, as well as those respondents who did not believe other 
countries to be hostile to Russia, between 2007 and 2017.  
Figures 3.1-3.7 cover measurements associated with ethno-nationalism or its popularity 
during roughly the same period (again, some slight deviation in certain graphs) as gathered in 
polls conducted by Levada-Center. Figure 3.1 measures belief in ethnic Russian exceptionalism, 
showing responses to the question “What role do (ethnic) Russians have in world history?”, as 
measured in 1992, 1999, 2016, and 2017. Figure 3.2 measures positive and negative responses to 
the question, “What is your opinion of ‘Russia for Russians’?” between 2007 and 2017. Figure 
3.3 measures responses to the question, “Do you feel like there is inter-ethnic tension in the 
city/region where you live?” between 2007 and 2017. Figure 3.4 measures the percent of 
respondents who believed that the government should introduce new barriers or restrictions to 
limit immigration, between 2007 and 2017. Figure 3.5 measures positive responses to two 
questions: “Do you currently feel hostility from other ethnicities?” and “Do you currently feel 
hostility toward other ethnicities” between 2007 and 2017. Figure 3.6 measures responses to the 
question, “Do you believe massive, bloody, interethnic clashes could currently occur in Russia?” 
between 2007 and 2017. Figure 3.7 measures responses to the question, “Do you believe 
massive, bloody, interethnic clashes could currently occur where you live?” between 2007 and 
2017.  
These graphs were then compared to one another and used to find correlations between 
changes in the popularity of state-nationalism, ethno-nationalism, and the levels/use of 
nationalist violence. The findings were analyzed in the context of the historical timeline/analysis, 
and used to examine how violence either reflected or influenced changes in the relative 
popularity of ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism in Russia.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY 
 
It is true that violence often accompanies nationalism, however violence is often present 
to some degree throughout many forms of political competition—to quote Clausewitz, “War is 
the continuation of politics by other means.” However, the fact that people resort to violence in 
order to accomplish or force their political objectives does not seem to explain the inordinate and 
nigh-systemic presence of violence in “nationalist” contests. Violence of this sort is not exclusive 
to conventional warfare between nation-states; “nationalist violence” is also an intranational 
phenomenon that is commonly associated with ethno-nationalist ideologies. Ethno-nationalists 
often challenge the state and its monopoly on violence, yet states also employ/promote their own 
nationalist concepts to strengthen their monopolies on violence. Is the prevalence of intranational 
“nationalist violence” merely a measure of insufficient state enforcement, or does it reflect and 
influence the contest between competing concepts of nationalism? How does the role of violence 
change between different nationalist concepts? How do state-nationalist concepts such as 
patriotism differ from ethno-nationalist concepts such as xenophobia? What all of these 
questions essentially ask is whether the relationship between nationalism and violence is 
situational, or structural. If it is in fact the latter, then we should be able to compare rates of 
nationalist violence to measures of nationalist contest, and establish recognizable and 
understandable patterns/relationships between them. 
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It is important to note that while this theory deals with the nation-state, it does not assert 
that this is the only political basis of states. Nationalism in its modern political form emerged as 
a distinct phenomenon in the 18th century, whereas states have clearly existed for far longer. 
Therefore, one must acknowledge that there are other kinds of relationships between states and 
violence which do not depend upon nationalism. However, the emergence of nationalism in the 
18th century appears to have coincided with a dramatic rise in both state capacity to mobilize 
violence, and the strength of state monopolies on violence. In her work “Mercenaries, Pirates, 
and Sovereigns”, Janice Thomson examines the historical development of states, warfare, and 
sovereignty to argue that true state monopolies on violence were only achieved in the 19th 
century. Prior to then, the right to control, use, and contest monopolies on violence had been 
considered the purview of any local actor who had the capacity to do so—be they the state, 
regional lords, mercenaries, private armies, etc.1 Thomson borrows from Tilly’s work detailing 
the efforts of state-builders to extract coercive capabilities (i.e. control over the use of force) 
from actors within their territory to consolidate internal violence, and applies this concept to the 
state’s monopolization of external violence, reflected in the demise of privateers, international 
mercenary armies, and military filibusters. Thomson even notes that this consolidation: 
“…marked the transition from heteronomy to sovereignty and the transformation of states 
into the national state system.”2 
Yet Thomson does not attribute nor examine the role of nationalist ideology and the 
emergence of “national” identities in this transition, instead citing developments in state 
                                                          
1 Thomson, Janice E. Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early 
Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Accessed November 30, 2018. 
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/lib/unc/reader.action?docID=617273.  
 
2 Ibid, p. 4 
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capabilities and expectations between states in the international system as the factors leading to 
successful state monopolization of violence. She even explicitly acknowledges that her book: 
“…has not addressed the question of how states were able to overcome domestic 
opposition to the disarming of non-state actors.”3 
In short, Thomson attempts to address all of the factors of monopolies on violence—the state, 
sovereignty, territory, and violence—except national identity. The result is a glaring, 
nationalism-shaped hole in both her theory and analysis. 
 What this theory proposes, is that while the state defines the monopoly on violence 
“downwards” upon its subjects, the concept of the nation emerged as a collective political 
identity which defines the monopoly on violence “upwards” upon the state. The ownership of 
and capacity for violence in the nation-state is thus no longer a resource which the state can only 
exhaustingly coerce and extract from various actors within its territory, but rather one which it 
can negotiate from its subjects/citizens by appealing to a common, shared, “national” political 
identity. In this sense, nationalism reflects the tripartite relationship between individual, nation, 
and state over the ownership and use of violence. Non-state nationalism (ethno-nationalism 
being the predominant form) would seek to promote a “bottom-up” relationship on political 
sovereignty, wherein the sovereignty of the state is an extension of it reflecting an intrinsically 
sovereign “national” identity (be it ethnic, cultural, religious etc.). Conversely, state-nationalism 
would seek to promote a “top-down” relationship, wherein the “national identity” is more 
defined by the sovereignty and territorial imperatives of the state rather than by any one specific 
ethnic, cultural, or religious affiliation. What this would entail is that non-state nationalism—
                                                          
3 Ibid, p. 152 
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namely ethno-nationalism—propagates because political actors believe that the current state does 
not sufficiently reflect/represent their concept of the nation.  
In his work “Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany”, Rogers Brubaker 
analyzes the differing basis and logic of state-nationalism and ethno-nationalism by comparing 
the evolution of France’s jus soli, state-national concept of national identity with the evolution of 
Germany’s jus sanguinis, ethno-national concept of national identity. Jus soli defines the 
citizenry as a territorial community (right of soil), and jus sanguinis defines the citizenry as a 
community of descent (right of blood).4 Brubaker primarily attributes the respective prevalence 
of these concepts in France and Germany to differences in their historical developments vis a vis 
the state, and demographic circumstances. The emergence of the nation-state in Revolutionary 
France which promoted a national identity (or concept of citizenship) predicated off of the 
territorial and political prerogatives of the state contrasts with the development of the German 
nation-state, which first saw the emergence of an ethnically defined, homogenous German 
“national identity” upon which the project of a German “state” later built itself. Or as Brubaker 
himself summarizes: 
“The French understand their nation as the creation of their state, the Germans their 
nation as the basis of their state.”5 
In this case, Brubaker’s French nationalism represents an “ideal type” of state-
nationalism, and his German nationalism represents an “ideal type” of ethno-nationalism. As 
Brubaker argues in the case of Germany, the emergence of (bottom-up) ethno-nationalism can be 
                                                          
4 Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. New York: ACLS History E-Book 
Project, 2005. Accessed April 23, 2019. https://ebookcentral-proquest-
com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/lib/unc/reader.action?docID=3299992. p. 134 
 
5 Ibid, p. 184 
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primarily attributed to two factors: the (initial) absence of a powerful, territorially and politically 
unifying state, and the (initial) ethnic/cultural homogeneity of Germany during the early-mid 19th 
century.6 Conversely, the relative cosmopolitanism of France’s Ancien Régime and subsequent 
Revolutionary government, coupled with the powerful, territorially and politically consolidating 
nature of the French state led to the emergence of (top-down) state-nationalism. Yet Brubaker 
makes it clear that even these “archetypal” French and German cases are far from unchallenged 
or unassailable—growing immigration to the heart of Europe has sparked internal debate over 
national identity and citizenship in both countries that has been building for decades. Ethno-
nationalist concepts and platforms challenge the dominant state-nationalism of France (e.g. 
National Rally), and in Germany, state-nationalist arguments critical of the jus sanguinis, ethno-
centric citizenship restrictions have gained more and more traction over time.7 An increasingly 
globalized world means increasingly multi-ethnic nation-states: wherein state actors are driven to 
promote state-centric national identities which strengthen their territorial and political security, 
including the support and compliance of the public. Meanwhile ethno-nationalist actors promote 
ethno-centric national identities to combat perceived demographic threats, and gain leverage, 
control over, or preferential treatment from the state. 
This divide between the interests of the state and the interests of ethno-nationalists in 
multi-ethnic societies creates points for potential conflict between ethno-centric nationalist 
narratives against state-centric nationalist narratives. Of course, not all multi-ethnic states 
experience the same degree or scale of conflict between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism, 
and therefore some cases are better suited than others for observing this contest. Highly diverse 
                                                          
6 Ibid, p. 124 
 
7 Ibid. p. 14 
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states with no single majority ethnic group such as the former Yugoslavia rarely present one 
dominant, prevailing ethno-nationalist identity as an alternative to the state-nationalist identity, 
and instead would see a number of ethno-nationalist movements which seek to separate from the 
state rather than supplant it. Although separatist minority ethno-nationalist movements certainly 
employ violence in their contests with the state, these conflicts have more in common with 
contests/warfare between distinct nationalities, rather than the contest between two competing 
concepts of national identity (i.e. nationalisms). Therefore, while the role of minority ethno-
nationalism is important to contests between majority ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism 
(particularly due to the fact that state-nationalism is in many ways designed to prevent or mollify 
minority ethno-nationalism), for the purposes of this paper we will be focusing on the contest 
between “majority” ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism. 
Ultimately, if nationalism serves to mediate the relationship between nation, state, and 
individual over violence, then the contest between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism 
should be reflected through—or correlate with—metrics which measure the “monopoly on 
violence”. The monopoly on violence is a zero-sum resource which cannot be jointly controlled 
between competing ethno-nationalist and state-nationalist movements—the relative strength or 
success of one should theoretically be reflected in the weakening of the other’s “monopoly on 
violence”. If this is true, then we should observe a rise in popularity for ethno-nationalism lead to 
lower support for the state and its control/use of violence; conversely, increases in state-
nationalism support/popularity should be reflected in decreased support/prevalence of ethno-
nationalist violence. By comparing data on the popularity/prevalence of ethno-nationalism to 
state-nationalism, to data on nationalist violence, we can identify whether or not this role of 
violence is reflected within the competition between state-nationalism and ethno-nationalism.
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CHAPTER 3: CASE ANALYSIS 
 
Contemporary Russia is a particularly well-suited case for analyzing the role of violence 
in contests between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism. As the largest country on earth, 
spanning most of northern Eurasia, the Russian state and its predecessors have had a long history 
of utilizing various forms of “Imperial” state-nationalism to govern and consolidate control over 
a multitude of different ethnic groups. It’s immediate predecessor the USSR was one of the most 
ethnically diverse countries in the world, surpassed only by India in both the size and diversity of 
its population—a state of affairs which Soviet leadership managed by repressing ethno-
nationalism and instead promoting a common, socialist, “Soviet” identity among its citizens. Yet 
ethno-nationalism played a key role in the collapse of the USSR in 1991, as popular nationalist 
movements in many of its constituent republics crusaded the dissolution of the union along 
national lines. The Russian Federation which emerged immediately faced a demographic, 
ideological, and “national identity” crisis—the “Soviet identity” had perished with socialism, yet 
as a consequence of their central and “leading” role in the former USSR, ethnic Russians had no 
popular movement of “Russian national identity” to fill the void like many of the breakaway 
republics. 
The separation of the 15 republics meant that the newly emerged Russian Federation was 
now two-thirds the size of the USSR, with just over half the population of its predecessor—yet 
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whereas ethnic Russians had comprised approximately 50% of the population of the 
USSR, they now made up 83% of the population of the Russian Federation.8 Yet unlike the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, Russia did not experience a complete breakup along national lines, and 
therefore the “Imperial dilemma” which had contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
not fully resolved. The emerging Russian Federation was clearly the “successor” to the USSR, 
inheriting the majority of its territory, its people, and its geopolitical strength and influence in the 
region. Both the breakup and its immediate aftermath saw outbreaks of ethnic/nationalist 
violence and conflicts, most notably in the Caucasus, spurring many Russians to reevaluate the 
role of ethnicity in their identities—whilst simultaneously reminding government officials in 
Moscow that ethno-nationalism would continue to threaten what was left of the state’s fragile 
territorial integrity.   Furthermore, given Russia’s dominant position relative to its newly 
independent neighbors, there were clear opportunities and incentives for the leadership of the 
state to promote a non-exclusive, state-nationalist identity that would enable Russia to reclaim 
the “imperial” legacy, power, and territory of its multinational predecessors, the USSR and the 
Tsarist Russian Empire.  
Thus, the stage was set for the emergence of two competing “schools” of Russian 
national identity: An ethnic Russian or “Russkii”-centric identity championed by ethno-
nationalists, and the state-sponsored “patriotism” emphasizing a common “Rossiiskii” identity 
superseding ethnic ties in favor of loyalty to the state. The relatively broad appeal of ethno-
nationalist sentiments in the wake of growing ethnic tensions, identity crisis, and a brutal conflict 
in the Caucasus has been matched against an increasingly empowered state which seeks to 
recover Russia’s global—and “imperial”—legacy, and is hardly willing to tolerate threats to its 
                                                          
8 Sakwa, Richard (1998). Soviet Politics in Perspective. London: Routledge. pp. 242–250.  
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stability, power, and public support. That the current Russian government prefers, supports, and 
propagates this state-nationalism position over ethno-nationalism is evident, as Putin himself 
stated in 2016: 
“We don't have and there can't be any other unifying idea, apart from patriotism, and that 
is a national idea. [It is not enough that] the president or anyone else speaks about this 
just once, we need to talk about it constantly, at all levels.”9 
The fact that Russia’s contest between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism is distinct, 
divisive, and politically significant—with each side operating from significant positions of 
strength (ethno-nationalism buoyed by its remarkably broad appeal among the ethnic Russian 
majority, and “Imperial” state-nationalism seen as a necessity by the powerful and centralized 
Russian state)—makes it a uniquely suited example of polarized contest between ethno-
nationalism and state nationalism. The most recent comparable examples were the “imperial 
dilemmas” faces by the old multinational empires of Europe which collapsed in the wake of 
WW1 and WW2. In contemporary political history, few other nation-states of such size and 
significance continue to face such a divisive contest over national identity, with the potential for 
such major political consequences (India, and perhaps the United States being among the few 
comparable examples). As a result, the contest between competing concepts of ethno-nationalism 
versus state-nationalism is notably central to the politics of Russia, which should in theory allow 
us to observe it more directly, without it being obscured by other, more prominent political 
divisions and contests.  
                                                          





In order to properly analyze this contest in the case of Russia—as in any case-specific 
study—our data analysis must be framed within a comprehensive historical analysis of Russian 
nationalism. Therefore, a review of the existing literature on contemporary Russian nationalism 
(focusing on the competition between state-nationalism and ethno-nationalism) is necessary in 
order to provide both context and support for our statistical observations and inferences. The 
necessity of this literary/historical context is made doubly important due to the fact that 
comprehensive and reliable statistical data on nationalism and violence in Eastern Europe has in 
the past been relatively scarce, leaving gaps during certain periods such as the 1990s and early 
2000s—a lament echoed by many scholars of the field. As noted scholar of right-wing 
extremism, Cas Mudde wrote in his 2005 article ‘Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern 
Europe’:  
“There is a notable lack of reliable information on racist extremism in the region, both 
academic and non-academic.” 
This echoed previous comments by others, and emphasizes the limits on how much we can rely 
exclusively on data to chart the development of nationalist violence since the collapse of the 
USSR and Warsaw Pact.10 This state of affairs was primarily due to the lack of sufficient 
monitoring and research on nationalist or right-wing extremist violence by the governments of 
these regions themselves. To again quote Mudde: 
“Racist extremism is not considered to be a major issue in the public and political arenas 
of Central and Eastern Europe.  Mainstream political parties are particularly passive in 
this regard, and seem to become active only when their political position is threatened by 
racist extremist parties.”11 
                                                          
10 Mudde, C. (2005). Racist Extremism in Central & Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. p 247. 
 
11 Ibid, 256. 
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The associated lack of diligence by governments to publicize and document the 
phenomenon placed the burden of monitoring upon independent researchers and NGOs (both 
domestic and international) who oftentimes run into major bureaucratic, political, and legal 
obstacles. One example of this is the Russian legislature’s “undesirable organizations law” 
passed and signed by Vladimir Putin in 2015, giving prosecutors expansive and loosely defined 
powers to declare foreign and international organizations “undesirable” and shut them down. 
This law was quickly used to target organizations such as the National Endowment for 
Democracy, the Carnegie Moscow Center, and human rights groups Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch.12 As a result, measurements of violence/the monopoly on violence, ethno-
nationalist support/popularity, and state-nationalist support/popularity have to be compiled from 
whatever reliable data is made available by NGO’s. “Ideal” data sets for measuring or observing 
these phenomena are few and far between, and therefore an assortment of various databases and 
polls as they exist must be compared, analyzed, and supplemented by the existing literature.  
The data analysis of this paper covers the period between 2007-2018, and analyzes 
metrics of violence, ethno-nationalism, and state-nationalism in Russia, as gathered by the 
Russian NGOs, SOVA Center and Levada Center. It is however preceded by a literature analysis 
covering the history of contemporary Russian ethno-nationalism, state-nationalism, and 
nationalist violence between 1991 and 2014. The reasons for this different timeline are twofold: 
firstly, it provides necessary context and examples on the development of ethno-nationalism and 
state-nationalism—as well as the use of violence—both prior to the period of time covered by 
                                                          
 
12
 Makutina, Maria, Lola Tagaeva, and Polina Khimshiashvili. "Prosecutor General's Office Asked to Close the First 




our data, and up to the key events of 2014 which are central to our analysis and findings; 
secondly, the more recent developments which have occurred since 2015 have not had as much 
comprehensive literature and studies published on them yet (and what has been published is 
somewhat speculative), as it will understandably take time for researchers and scholars of the 
field to observe and analyze the lasting impacts on Russian nationalism resulting from Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea. By establishing a historical background between 1991 to 2014, the 
following chapter establishes the contest between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism in 
Russia, provides historical context for the data between 2007-2014 (up to the annexation of 
Crimea), and informs our data analysis by introducing pre-existing research on the role of 
violence in Russian nationalism. 
Before we delve into the historical analysis, it is necessary to address the prevailing 
arguments against the “ethno-nationalism vs state-nationalism” framework of nationalist politics 
in Russia. Most scholars of the subject tend to acknowledge the two general camps of ethno-
nationalist, and “Imperial” or state-nationalist approaches. One notable argument against this 
approach of conflicting definitions of “nationalism”, is that the delineation between ethno-
nationalism and state-nationalism is often unclear. The reason for this is that both the Russian 
state and various ostensibly “ethno-nationalist” actors have at times employed rhetoric or stances 
more commonly associated with the opposing side. As Marlene Laruelle argues,  
“the main nationalist and political ideologues can simultaneously use both the 
imperialistic and ethno-nationalistic arguments.”13  
                                                          
13 Laruelle, M. (2014a), ‘Russkii natsionalizm kak oblast’ nauchnykh issledovanii’ [Russian nationalism as an object 
of research], Pro et Contra, 62, 1–2: p. 59. 
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This sentiment—though worth keeping in mind when analyzing the rhetoric of specific 
political actors—disregards the value of delineating the two driving forces behind Russian 
national identity: the state, and the Russian ethnic group. That the state has at times attempted to 
coopt ethno-nationalist rhetoric, or that ethno-nationalist actors have at times aligned themselves 
with state-nationalist policies is apparent, however as the following section will demonstrate 
these compromises have generally proven to be a temporary state of affairs. While the contest 
between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism plays out on a meta-scale of public opinion, it 
is important to recognize that the specific actors which we associate with these camps reside in 
the real political world, face constantly changing political pressures and circumstances, and must 
















CHAPTER 4: RUSSIAN NATIONALISM 
  
Historically, the post-Soviet Russian state’s relationship with nationalism since 1991 has 
not always been as close as it is today. After 1991, the legacy of a carefully constructed, multi-
ethnic Soviet identity was immediately rebranded by the new Russian state as a new rossiiskii 
identity.14 Deliberately framed to evoke a Russian identity without connoting Russian ethnicity 
(the term for which is russkii), this new regime had just emerged from a polity that had been 
fragmented by nationalism, and was desperate to secure the remaining territorial integrity of 
what was still a markedly multi-ethnic, regionalized society. As Richard Arnold writes:  
“The country is a patchwork quilt of ethnic minorities who, due in part to the Soviet 
legacy of institutionalizing ethnic groups on “their” historical homeland, are ready-made 
nations. Any policy that officially elevated ethnic Russians above the other constituent 
peoples of the Russian Federation could therefore have the foreseeable consequence of 
producing a backlash from other ethnic minorities and, by extension, the country’s 
fragmentation.”15 
As a result, the Russian state of the early-mid 90’s promoted what was in essence a 
spiritual successor to the old Soviet identity, and largely refrained from promoting any 
definitively “nationalist” discourse or identity. Despite the state’s ambivalence however, the 
Russian people proved to be an eager audience for nationalist platforms, and an emergent 
Russian ethno-nationalist movement began to draw significant attention in the public political
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sphere. In 1993 the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia won 22.9% of the popular vote in the 
Duma elections (contrary to what the name would imply the LDPR is “neither liberal nor 
democratic”16)—the LDPR was one of several conservative parties that had responded to the 
anti-Russian sentiment of ex-Soviet republics through pro-Russian nationalist rhetoric of its own. 
Throughout the decade, economic instability coupled with controversial migration from Central 
Asia and a brutal, protracted conflict in Chechnya led to increasing popularization of nationalist 
rhetoric amongst the ethnically Russian (russkii) population of the Russian Federation.  
Nationalist dialogue was not immediately dominated by “conventional” ethno-nationalist 
sentiment however—decades of suppression and political marginalization had stunted the 
emergence and maturation of truly comprehensive and coherent platforms for non-Communist 
ideologies, and Russian ethno-nationalism was no exception. Initially following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, a majority of mainstream nationalist movements were of the state-nationalist 
type: they leaned to the political left, and glorified the former Soviet identity and systems.17 
Idealizing the recently lost Soviet identity, these movements promoted a nostalgic Soviet 
nationalism in the hopes of recreating the polity of the USSR. Yet the greater obstacle facing 
Russian ethno-nationalism was the fact that it lacked a strong historical political-tradition to 
build upon. This was due to the way in which the Russian state had originally developed through 
empire rather than nation, Russia having never before truly defined the ethnically Russian 
nation-state. If the development of the nation-state were to be considered as a “historical 
dialectic” analogous to Marxist theories on the development of Communism, Russia had 
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“skipped” the articulation of nation and state much as it would later “skip” the development of a 
proletariat prior to revolution. By the mid-17th century, the empire ruled by the Tsar was already 
the world’s single largest geographically contiguous realm.18 Historian Richard Pipes described 
this development, writing: 
“There were Finns and Turks under Russian rule when the national state was only 
beginning to take shape. Later, other nationalities joined them. As a result, the building of 
the national state and the forging of an empire, processes which in the west were clearly 
separated both in time and in space, proceeded in Russia concurrently and contiguously 
and became virtually indistinguishable.”19 
Although clearly defined by a dominant “Russian” culture and ethnicity, the demands of 
imperial expansion led the growing Tsarist political and military establishment to adopt a policy 
of selective co-optation of indigenous elites, accompanied by their cultural assimilation. The 
result of this rapid expansion coupled with uniform Tsarist administrative policy, was the 
blurring of lines between an ethnic Russian center and the greater multinational periphery 
encompassed by the state.20 While the empire may have been dominated by ethnic Russians and 
Russian culture, the identity of the state which developed was fundamentally rooted in that of the 
Russian dominated multi-ethnic/national empire, rather than that of an exclusive, ethnically 
Russian nation. While ethnic Russian consciousness was undoubtedly very real, it was reflected 
as collective belonging in the Orthodox Christian peasantry, separate and distinct from the 
state.21 With the secularization of Russian society which occurred during the USSR, the 
centrality of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian identity was diminished, and gradually supplanted by 
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the concept of an ethnic Russian narod (people). This presented a unique obstacle for the 
development of Russian ethno-nationalism, as the Russian empire precluded the development of 
a genuine Russian nation-state. The later policies of the USSR only further blurred the line 
between center and periphery, and restricted the development of Russian ethno-nationalism in 
favor of an inclusive multinational Soviet identity. 
  What this meant for the Russian political landscape of the 1990s was that both Russian 
society and the Russian state faced the challenge of mediating a new identity, one caught 
between multinational empire and nation-state. The implications for Russian nationalism have 
been vast, creating natural chasms for division between statist and ethno-nationalist 
interpretations. Nationalism itself became a field of contest—where historically the 
“multiethnic” (albeit Russian dominated) Russian state had proven effective at retaining its 
undisputed authority and ownership over the legitimate use of force within its ethnically-Russian 
population (if not among all of its non-Russian subjects), the emergence of Russian ethno-
nationalism now threatened to undermine that legitimacy. Of course, few would argue that the 
legitimacy of the government rests solely on nationalist questions; economic and political 
stability are obviously powerful forces which shape public opinion towards the state. History has 
shown however that nationalism often emerges as an extremely effective legitimacy-generating 
force when economic and political conditions are unfavorable; nationalism provides a powerful 
ideological pillar of “normalcy”, particularly in the wake of economic and political turmoil.22 
Amid the economic and political turmoil of the 1990s, ethnic Russians began to search for 
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answers that offered a new sense of normalcy in a post-Soviet world. Marlène Laruelle cites the 
centrality of this “quest for normalcy” in the popularity of nationalism in Russia, writing: 
“Requested as much by its citizens as by political authorities, the normalization of the 
country demands that a consensus be established, and the notion of the motherland 
(rodina) is alone apt to achieve this: there is no other symbol which, traversing all 
divisions, generates as broad an adhesion as that of the nation.”23 
Ideology is of course, a far easier thing to manipulate, use, and control than the economy. 
Nationalism may be used as an ideological tool for the control and manipulation of violence; 
however, this does not deny that it is also remarkably effective at generating political support as 
well. Its inherent emotional, social, and communal appeal is precisely why it appears to be so 
effective at generating and legitimizing violence. The relative weakness of the Russian state in 
the 1990s, coupled with new conflicts in the Caucasus and growing ethnic tensions in the urban 
centers created a fertile ground for the gestation of ethno-nationalist sentiment and ideology 
which by the turn of the millennium sought to challenge the status-quo. 
 One of the most well-known Russian ethno-nationalist organizations during the 1990s 
was Russian National Unity (RNE). Founded in 1990 by former Pamyat Council member 
Aleksandr Barkashov, RNE was founded as a neo-Nazi political party and paramilitary 
organization, and from its onset promoted an extremely radical platform of ethnic Russian 
supremacy, racial homogeneity, ethnically defined territorial restrictions, and dictatorial 
authoritarianism.24 The overall goal of the RNE was stated as “the restoration of Russia as a 
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national state and the rebirth of the Russian Nation.”25 It quickly distinguished itself from other 
radical ethno-nationalist organizations by the virtue of its popularity, extremism, militarism, and 
vigilantism. Of the plethora of ethno-nationalist organizations which emerged in the 1990s, RNE 
provides one of the best examples of the ethno-nationalist platform; many ethno-nationalist 
individuals who would be active in the 2000s had first encountered the ideology through 
membership in RNE during the 1990s, and RNE members and former members have regularly 
been associated with acts of political and racial violence from the 1990s up to the modern day.26 
Although marginalized in national politics, RNE established itself across Russia on the 
provincial and regional level. Concrete records of early membership (and therefore growth) are 
limited, however on October of 1993 approximately 100 RNE members were directly involved 
in the confrontation between Yeltsin and the Duma, forming the core of the armed defenders 
present at the White House.27 By the end of 1994, Barkashov himself claimed to have 20,000 
members, 4,500 in Moscow alone, and in 1996 Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that the RNE 
had approximately 25,000 members across Russia.28 Membership was believed to have peaked in 
1999, with estimates ranging anywhere from 20 to 100,000 members.29 Considering the limited 
political presence of RNE, its reputation for political and ideological extremism, and the 
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famously rigid and demanding paramilitary structure and obligations of the organization, such a 
large member count is a sobering testimony to the growing appeal of extreme ethno-nationalist 
ideology during the 1990s, and provides valuable perspective on the dramatic eruption of 
racially-targeted nationalist violence in the 2000s. 
The relationship between the RNE and violence is immediately obvious, as the 
organization is fundamentally structured around political paramilitarism—members were directly 
expected to take part in violence on behalf of the organization, and along with regular attacks by 
RNE members against ethnic minorities30, the dominant presence of RNE members during the 
violent Yeltsin-Duma clash in 1993 attests to this. This was not entirely aimless violence 
however: members were required to swear an oath stipulating their obligation to defend the 
Russian (russkii) nation, and to undergo special military training.31 The extent and scale of this 
training was such that Shenfield stresses RNE was first and foremost a military machine, 
claiming that although other political forces in Russia had youth auxiliaries with measures of 
military capability: 
“…only the RNE (and other smaller groups of a similar kind) has devoted such a high 
proportion of its resources to building up its potential for directed violence.”32 
The emerging contest between Russian ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism thus 
began to manifest over both public opinion and the use/ownership of violence. That is not to say 
that random acts of racist violence alone constitute a conscious strategy of contesting the state’s 
monopoly on violence—there is evidence to suggest that RNE operations inadvertently 
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challenged the legitimacy of the state’s control of violence. Shenfield identifies two roles 
regularly assumed by the RNE across the country: pre-draft military training, and “voluntary 
police patrols”. The first essentially consisted of camps and programs where young men were 
given formal military training to prepare them for future military service—this was however 
structured within an ideological curriculum that indoctrinated the trainees with the RNE’s ethno-
nationalist platform. The latter consisted of RNE volunteers who either assisted or replaced local 
police in patrolling public places—one consequence being that RNE members had free reign to 
engage in violence against ethnic minorities, and as Shenfield writes:  
“…accustomed the public to the officially approved presence in the streets, parks, and 
marketplaces of blackshirted young men with swastikas on their sleeves.” 33 
In both cases, the RNE acted to imitate or infiltrate state institutions, with the effect 
(intentional or not) of coopting and supplanting the formal or “legitimate” avenues of controlling 
and exercising violence, which are normally reserved by the state. This “acquisition” of the use 
of violence by the RNE served to publicly legitimize the organization and its ethno-nationalist 
ideology—while simultaneously undermining and delegitimizing the state. By taking on roles of 
military training and enforcing public order, the RNE telegraphed to members of the Russian 
public that the current state was both incapable and unnecessary, whereas russkii ethno-
nationalists were ready and capable of using violence to “protect” the narod (nation) and its 
sovereignty. This phenomenon lends some support to the hypothesis that competition between 
ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism is to some degree reflected in the “ownership” or use of 
violence. Securing public support and “legitimacy” for their use of violence on behalf of “the 
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nation” helped ethno-nationalists popularize and normalize their own platform among the 
Russian people, at the expense of the state’s legitimacy. 
The 1990’s essentially served as an incubation period for both state and ethno-
nationalism in Russia. With the exception of the 1993 elections, public Russian political 
discourse of the 1990s had largely avoided the subject of Russian nationalism in lieu of more 
pressing concerns. The economic depression, the 1993 political crisis, the incredibly unpopular 
First Chechen War, economic privatization, the financial collapse of 1998, and various political 
scandals of the Yeltsin administration had left little space for public discussion of Russian 
national identity. Yet throughout the decade and into the next, nationalist ideologues had 
gradually been shaping their platforms, and ethnic tensions between ethnic Russians and 
migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia had begun to foment. Conversely, during the mid-
1990s, Eurasianism emerged as one of the strongest currents of Russian state-nationalism and 
intellectual leaders of the movement such as Alexander Dugin had begun developing close ties 
with powerful individuals, their political connections eventually leading Dugin to a close 
relationship with the Kremlin.34 Yet of the various nationalist ideological platforms, russkii 
ethno-nationalism had clearly made the most progress in the court of public opinion by the end 
of the decade.  
As we can see in Figure 3.1 (Appendix 3, pg. 70), in 1992 during the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of the USSR, the vast majority of Russians had yet to begin publicly 
espousing open support/preference for russkii ethno-nationalism. When asked their opinion on 
the role of Russians as an ethnic group, nearly 80% of respondents replied that “(Ethnic) 
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Russians are a people just like others”, with only 13% replying that “(Ethnic) Russians are a 
great, chosen people with a special role in world history.” It should be noted that this figure 
doesn’t necessarily reflect the genuine sentiments of the population surveyed, but does at least 
reflect which position they felt comfortable espousing. In part, this lack of affiliation with ethno-
nationalist identity could also be partially attributed to holdover affiliation to the former state-
nationalist “Soviet” identity. Yet within only seven years public opinion had changed 
dramatically, and by 1999 57% of respondents openly subscribed to ethnic Russian 
exceptionalism. To a certain extent this rise in ethno-nationalism was a response to the vacuum 
that Yeltsin’s unpopular rossiiskii state-nationalism had failed to occupy. The popular Soviet 
state-nationalism that still dominated public identity and discourse in 1992 had yet to be 
particularly weakened among ethnic Russians by the economic and social chaos that had marked 
the final decade of Soviet rule, and therefore the economic and political failings of the Yeltsin 
administration during the 1990s themselves cannot be assumed to solely account for the dramatic 
rise in Russian ethno-nationalism. A number of different factors undoubtedly contributed to this 
shift (such as the religiously and racially charged conflicts in the Caucasus), but ultimately the 
weakness of Yeltsin’s uninspiring rossiiskii state-nationalism offered little resistance to ethno-
nationalist narratives in the world of 1990s identity-politics. 
 With the turn of the millennium, the incoming administration of Vladimir Putin clearly 
recognized that Yeltsin’s neutered “federation focused” civic approach to state-nationalism had 
been a failure. Putin’s new brand of state-nationalism (originally termed derzhavnost35 or state 
power-ness) gradually began to embrace more and more nostalgia for the lost empire of the 
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USSR, mirroring the sentiments of a man who asserts that “the demise of the Soviet Union was 
the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”36 This trend has continued steadily each 
year since his first annual address to the federal assembly, to the point that his 2012 speech 
included a clear Eurasianism “dog-whistle”, via a reference to its ideological architect Lev 
Gumilev.37 For the Kremlin, Eurasianism offers the benefit of being a state-nationalism which 
provides the ideological structure for a foreign policy designed to increase Russia’s influence 
across the former Soviet Union. Yet despite its new approach to state-nationalism, the Putin 
administration never repudiated the central logic behind Yeltsin’s pursuit of state-nationalism: 
the rejection of an official ethno-centric policy which would threaten the territorial fragmentation 
of the state. While it may not have embraced the cosmopolitanism or democratic spirit of French 
nationalism, Putin’s regime clearly subscribed to Brubaker’s “state-national” nationalism, 
“embedded in and inseparable from the institutional and territorial frame of the state”.38 
Russian ethnic insecurity has proved a powerful force however, and Kremlin displays of 
Russian state grandiosity during Putin’s first two terms did little to assuage growing xenophobia 
and racism. According to Pål Kolstø’s analysis on Russian Nationalism from 2000-2015, one of the 
most significant factors in the development of russkii racial insecurity was the sudden, dramatic 
influx of immigrants from Central Asia to the Russian metropole. Due to the start of a prolonged 
economic boom in Russia at the turn of the millennium, living standards between Russia and 
Central Asia began to widen drastically, kicking off what would become known as the “great 
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migration treks”, from the former Soviet states south of Russia to the growing cities of the 
Russian heartland. Between 1989 and 2004 Russia received 5.8 million migrants, mostly from 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. This massive influx of migrants, coupled with the loss of the 
Soviet system of full employment, resentment over growing economic inequality, and an 
ongoing, brutal war of insurgency in the North Caucasus fomented an increasingly volatile 
atmosphere of russkii ethnic insecurity, primed for violence.39 To borrow Richard Arnold’s 
description of what “ethnic insecurity” entailed: 
“This, coupled with Russia’s declining “indigenous” population (mostly attributed to 
declining fertility—see Heleniak, 2013), has created an atmosphere of seeming 
demographic surrender and de-industrialization similar to 1960s Western Europe, which 
has fed the growth of the skinhead movement.”40 
The actual influx of immigrants was only partly responsible for the fears of 
“demographic surrender” among the Russian population: the narrative which was spread by the 
Russian television media and capitalized upon by ethno-nationalists, of hordes of newcomers 
flooding into the country who were not only culturally alien but also dangerous made a major 
impact on the public.41 The centrality of this migration to Russian ethnic insecurity is reflected in 
the fact that one of the most influential nationalist organizations to emerge in the early 2000s was 
the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI).42 Likewise, it seems a telling coincidence 
that the economic upswing and migration began roughly around 2001, and that 2001 also marked 
the beginning of nearly a decade of widespread and systematic skinhead/neo-Nazi violence and 
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attacks against ethnic minorities, peaking only around 2008.43 Although Putin’s new approach to 
state-nationalism was challenged by this surge in ethno-nationalism and violence, the state did 
not initially prioritize confronting the issue. Given the economic catastrophes that had marred 
Yeltsin’s tenure throughout the 1990s, Russian public approval for Putin and the state was 
secured by the booming economy—at least until 2008.   
 Arnold’s analysis of skinhead/neo-Nazi violence from 2001-2009 provides a statistical 
background to the subsequent SOVA Center data on nationalist violence in the following 
sections between 2007-2018. Across his study, Arnold identifies a total of 965 reported skinhead 
attacks on explicitly ethnic targets—a significant number of attacks go unreported, and Arnold 
also found a further 198 reported skinhead attacks that had targeted “non-ethnic” people or 
property. One should keep in mind that each recorded attack represents an instance, not the 
number of victims; nor does each incident necessarily involve people rather than property.44 
What this number represents however is a concentrated and brutal campaign of violence which 
increased in intensity and scale for 8 straight years. In his analysis, Arnold makes the case that 
the violence was organized and perpetrated in a discriminatory fashion, with a particular 
emphasis on targeting those minorities deemed the greatest “threat” to ethnic Russian 
demographic “security”—namely Caucasians and Central Asians. The discriminatory nature of 
this violence reinforces the notion that this was primarily considered an act of “defense” of 
perceived ethnic sovereignty on the part of the perpetrators, and therefore was primarily ethno-
nationalist in substance. Arnold’s analysis supports the idea that ethno-nationalism legitimizes 
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violence on the basis of protecting an ethnic concept of “national sovereignty” i.e. protecting the 
ethnic nation’s sovereignty over its homeland.  
Prior to 2008, the Putin regime had avoided needing to play a major part in identity 
politics due to its delivery of economic prosperity—however economic growth had begun to 
stagnate in 2008 and now the political compliance of Russian society would have to be won 
through identity politics, propaganda, and safeguarding the people from alleged threats. What 
this meant is that the Kremlin would finally be forced to confront the rising tide of ethno-
nationalism, and the associated rise in ethno-nationalist violence. While in part due to simply 
hitting a breaking point in how much violence it could tolerate, the Kremlin’s initial strategy also 
seemed to try to avoid confronting ethno-nationalist ideology directly. It would be easier to 
attempt to rein in ethno-nationalism by exclusively targeting violence for suppression, rather 
than engaging in a debate over identity which seemed much more contentious, and much more 
likely to alienate support from ethnic Russians. In the past, ethno-nationalists had largely 
avoided overtly direct conflict with the state, taking advantage of a vacuum in state enforcement 
in order to somewhat freely commit ethnic violence. At the time, the Russian state saw its 
primary threat in the form of the “color revolutions” that had swept through Georgia, Ukraine, 
and Kyrgyzstan between 2003-2005—movements which had also been opposed by far-right 
ethno-nationalists, thereby offering a common ground for temporary cooperation.45 
By 2008 however, the state began prosecuting and jailing greater numbers of ethno-
nationalists for violent crimes. This would see the beginning of a direct confrontation between 
ethno-nationalists and the state, as certain ethno-nationalist individuals and organizations began 
                                                          




to retaliate and target the state and its organs for violence. In 2009, SOVA Center noted that 
ultra-right nationalist groups were increasingly engaging in anti-state terror, designed to 
destabilize state organizations involved in suppressing ethno-nationalist groups.46 This direct 
confrontation between ethno-nationalists and the state would culminate in the 2010 assassination 
of Russian judge Eduard Chuvashov by neo-Nazi gangs. Chuvashov had presided over several 
high-profile cases involving neo-Nazis, prominently sentencing one gang (the White Wolves) 
which was responsible for dozens of hate-killings with lengthy prison sentences in February of 
2010. During the trial, a prominent ethno-nationalist blogger wrote that Chuvashov advocated 
the killing of ethnic Russians, which in turn drew comments calling for Chuvashov’s murder. 
The following April, Chuvashov was murdered in the stairwell of his home in Moscow.47 In 
response, the government ramped up suppression and convictions of violent ethno-nationalists to 
record highs, and enacted a series of harsh “anti-extremist” legislation (such as the infamous law 
282) which allowed it to target ethno-nationalists under expanded definitions of illegal 
organization and propaganda.48 
Although the state’s efforts succeeded at suppressing the overall rate of ethno-nationalist 
violence, the failure to confront ethno-nationalist ideology—or more importantly, to present a 
popular alternative—meant that ethno-nationalist sentiments and ideology remained strong 
among the Russian public, whereas support for the state fell following the global recession. 
Although the state had been ramping up efforts to promote anti-Western sentiment as a method 
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of bolstering national unity and support for the state, these efforts had largely proven ineffective, 
and nationalist discourse was increasingly dominated by ethno-nationalism. Between 2009 and 
2013, numerous instances of crimes or murders committed by ethnic minorities were heavily 
publicized by the media, and subsequently utilized by ethno-nationalists to organize protests 
which sparked into riots. By 2012, ethno-nationalists constituted a powerful, independent 
political force, having begun publicly engaging in large-scale political displays and marches. 
Poor economic circumstances left the Kremlin with little choice but to curry public opinion 
through identity politics, which meant that the Kremlin could ill afford to ignore the ethno-
nationalist platform.  
To that aim, the Kremlin set out on a radical identity-based mobilization strategy, with 
the aim of fully appropriating the national cause. As future political stability would be rooted in 
Kremlin-defined Russian identity narratives, the Kremlin now sought to eliminate competing 
narratives from the public sphere.49 The first opening moves occurred during the 2012 election 
campaign, with Putin publishing newspaper articles and giving speeches that moderately 
espoused and addressed popular “ethno-nationalist” sentiment, such as acknowledging popular 
complaints against immigrants, and describing ethnic Russians (russkie) as Russia’s “state-
forming people”.50 Later in 2012, state-owned television channels initiated an anti-immigrant 
campaign aimed at both Muslim immigrants from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as well 
as internal migrants who originated from Russian territory in the North Caucasus. The campaign 
called for shutting down the borders, “to avoid the spread of crime, illness, and cultural 
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backwardness.”, and called the internal migration an “invasion”.51 Yet this attempt to appropriate 
the ethno-nationalist platform largely seems to have been ineffective. As we will see in the 
following sections ethno-nationalism only grew stronger between 2012 and 2013, while state 
approval ratings continued to drop—if anything, the Kremlin’s attempts at engaging in ethno-
nationalist dialogue only served to strengthen the ethno-nationalist platform at the expense of the 
state. Despite these attempts to court ethno-nationalist sentiments, ethno-nationalists would play 
a major role in the anti-Kremlin opposition rallies in 201252, and it became clear by 2013 that a 
mere shift in rhetoric would do little to mollify ethno-nationalist opposition to Putin’s regime. 
Luckily for the regime, Putin was soon presented with an ideal new opportunity to 
redefine the state’s relationship with Russian national identity, which would not require pitting 
the state against its non-ethnic Russian citizens, in the Ukrainian crisis. In analyzing Putin’s 
motivations behind the annexation of Crimea, many political specialists, scholars, and analysts 
specializing in Russian politics argue against viewing it as a “new cold war”, or as Putin 
“imitating Hitler”, but rather that Putin’s actions are best understood in light of the political 
pressures he faced at home. Nationalist discourse in Russia seemed to be shifting against the 
regime, the state had few other competitive angles with which to play at identity politics, and 
there was no looming economic boom which promised to bolster falling approval ratings. The 
Kremlin would need to dramatically reshape the playing field, and Crimea offered a perfect 
opportunity. For one, it struck a very convenient balance between Russia’s ethno-nationalist and 
state-nationalist camps: it allowed the regime to engage in reintegrating former Soviet territory 
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and thereby satisfying the “Imperial” state-nationalist objectives, while avoiding direct major 
backlash from ethno-nationalists for integrating non-Russians into the federation. As Henry Hale 
writes: 
“Crimea hits the “sweet spot” for Russian nationalism: a territory with an ethnic Russian 
majority that would not integrate many non-Russians into the Russian Federation.”53 
This was not however a case of political tail-wagging—by annexing Crimea, the Kremlin 
was in many was confronting the various non state-aligned nationalists of Russia. The Kremlin 
had not put the ethno-nationalist movement in control; political leadership had not changed 
hands, ethno-nationalist laws and definitions of citizenship had not been implemented, and the 
state had not made any attempts to change the status-quo in regards to the Central Asian and 
Caucasian “questions”. This action brought the Russian state into conflict with Ukraine—conflict 
with other Eastern Slavic nations had not been an objective of most Russian ethno-nationalists, 
and in fact was directly opposed by many. While on the surface, Crimea seemed to initially tap 
into certain ethno-nationalist sentiments within the public in that it “reunited Russian lands”, 
there was no rapprochement between ethno-nationalism and the state. Crimea had dramatically 
taken the wind out of the sails of ethno-nationalism, and sparked the creation of new, state-
nationalist organizations advocating support for the state and attacking ethno-centric concepts of 
national identity. When it came time in for the yearly “Russian March”—an ethno-nationalist 
parade in Moscow—2014 was carefully monitored by the regime and drew roughly only 2000 
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participants, compared to 6000-8000 in previous years.54 Simultaneously, those nationalist 
leaders who were not in the Kremlin’s good graces were subject to repression. Laine summarizes 
the events of 2014 as such: 
“The nationalist leaders, who previously could act rather freely, were detained, home 
searches were conducted, and some movements were banned. At the same time, 
nationalist movements loyal to the state emerged, and the state organized its own official 
celebrations on the Day of National Unity, which had previously been dominated by the 
radical nationalists. In other words, as the state wanted to gain a monopoly on 
nationalism, it could no longer stand contention in that space.”55 
What this historical and literature analysis provides us is a background to the contest 
between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism in Russia, as well as context going into the data 
analysis in the following section. However, in reviewing the literature we can also identify 
commonalities between the concept and theory of this thesis, and the work of other scholars. Of 
the various analyses of Russian ethno-nationalism, the conclusions reached by Arnold appear to 
most closely echo the theories of this paper. Firstly, Arnold indicates that the rise in ethno-
nationalist violence during his timeline can be at least in part attributed to perceived weaknesses 
in the state’s monopoly on violence, or in his words:  
“...the perceived lack of state involvement in guaranteeing the security of its citizenry”56 
Furthermore, Arnold positions the rise of “fascist” Russian ethno-nationalism as being first and 
foremost a rejection of the regime’s position of state-nationalism, writing:  
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“How could fascism come to be lauded in a country which gave 27 million lives to defeat 
its German variant? The most probable answer concerns the expression of opposition 
to the Russian regime and state in its current guise.”57 
He goes on to mention the prominent role of ethno-nationalists in the anti-regime protests 
of 2012, yet attributes their participation not to sympathy for the liberal, pro-democracy 
protestations against the current regime’s fraudulent victory in the 2012 elections, but rather that 
deeper analysis suggests their frustrations originated against the state itself. Arnold attributes this 
ethno-nationalist opposition to the state to frustration over its approach to the “Russian 
question”, and dissatisfaction with the prevailing state-nationalist policies which rejected an 
ethnically Russian identity and promoted a non-discriminatory, state-oriented national identity 
instead.58 
While Arnold’s conclusion posits many of the same interactions and basis behind the 
contest between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism put forward by this thesis, he does not 
directly examine nationalist violence as a metric of this contest. Rather, he primarily focuses on 
analyzing the strategies and motivations behind its different incarnations, creating a typology on 
the various messages that different modes of violence are intended to communicate to their 
victims. Though it serves as a fascinating study of violence as communication, it doesn’t address 
the simpler question of whether or not the use and control of violence reflects (or potentially 
impacts) the contest between competing nationalist concepts. To some degree, this could be 
attributed to the timeline of his study--the rise in ethno-nationalist violence between 2001-2009. 
This primarily covers a period of time before the Russian state began to decisively confront 
ethno-nationalist violence, and when a growing economy had allowed it the luxury of avoiding 
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identity politics. While Arnold’s analysis identified the root source of contemporary Russian 
ethno-nationalism as a rejection of the state-centric identity promoted by the regime, it didn’t 
examine how ethno-nationalist violence changed in the context of suppression by the regime and 
the eventual annexation of Crimea, and therefore did not fully observe how a “rise” in state-
nationalism conversely impacts and undermines ethno-nationalism.  
 In the following section, we apply the observations, background, and timeline provided 
by this historical analysis to an analysis of statistical data on ethno-nationalism, state-
nationalism, and nationalist violence between 2007-2018. Doing so allows us to understand how 
violence reflects and correlates with the contest between competing ethno-nationalist and state-
















CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
For the purpose of the data analysis, three things must be measured: violence, state-
nationalism, and ethno-nationalism. Measuring the first is rather straightforward: since 2007 the 
Moscow based, non-governmental research organization SOVA Center has gathered and 
published yearly data on ethnic/nationalist violence in Russia. The SOVA Center also measures 
and publishes statistical data on sentencing/convictions by the Russian state for various 
ethnic/racially motivated violence or otherwise nationalist-oriented crimes. These databases 
provide us with direct measures of ethno-nationalist violence, as well as measurements of the 
state’s suppression of nationalist organizations (and thus a tentative measure of its “monopoly” 
on said violence) albeit only between 2007-2018. There are however a number of issues 
concerning the SOVA Center data sets, particularly their database on acts of violence which 
must first be addressed. 
 First and foremost, SOVA Center openly acknowledges that their statistical data on 
violence is incomplete, and does not reflect the total number of victims/acts of violence which 
have occurred in Russia. This is due to the fact that the Russian federal government does not 
systematically collect/publish official statistics on hate crimes, nor does it always release 
complete details surrounding violent crimes which would allow one to reliably categorize them 
as such. Furthermore, the media often fails to report such crimes, or reports them with so little 
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information that identifying/verifying said crimes as hate crimes is difficult. Many victims also 
decline to report/inform the authorities or media that they were attacked, and therefore we can 
safely assume that many crimes go entirely unreported.59 To counteract these limitations SOVA 
Center regularly conduct their own investigations into reported acts of violence, and compile 
their data based around those instances of violence which they can verify as qualifying as hate 
crimes according to standards set by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(Sova-Center links to two OSCE Publications on Hate Crime Laws for reference in its yearly 
reports). Incidents might not be discovered or verified right away, and the database is subject to 
some fluctuation based on the relative effectiveness of regional law enforcement at 
communicating with the public. Certain regions such as Moscow and St. Petersburg report 
greater numbers of incidents to the public, whereas other regions such as Chelyabinsk or 
Krasnodar report little or no incidents whatsoever (irrespective of their real rates of nationalist 
violence/hate crimes).60  
Perhaps the most significant weakness inherent to the SOVA Center data on violence is 
that the data for more recent years is more incomplete and therefore somewhat less reliable than 
the data for earlier years in their timeline. To quote directly from the report on nationalist 
violence in 2018:  
“Of course, our 2018 data is still far from final, and, unfortunately, these numbers will 
inevitably grow, since, in many cases, the information only reaches us after a long 
delay.”61 
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Therefore, the particularly low statistics on violence in the latest years of the dataset (i.e. the 
figures for 2017 and 2018) should not be assumed to accurately reflect a continued decline from 
previous years (i.e. 2015 and 2016). Rather, SOVA Center maintains that levels of nationalist 
violence have mostly been stable—albeit still relatively low—between 2014-2018. To quote 
again from the report on 2018 violence:  
“Thus, our quantitative conclusions are purely preliminary, and it might be possible that, 
in the end, we will be seeing a small increase in the number of victims, rather than the 
current small decrease. Evidently, it would be more accurate to say that the number of 
victims has remained fairly stable over the past four years. This number is, of course, an 
order of magnitude lower than it was a decade ago, but still, the current level of 
ideological violence cannot be deemed insignificant.”62 
Although the real values present in the SOVA Center violence database are not a 
complete/accurate record of nationalist violence in Russia, the SOVA Center database on 
violence records all publicly confirmed hate crimes, as well as those incidents which they 
confirm through their own investigations, publishing detailed yearly reports/summaries of their 
findings. Thus, it represents one of the most comprehensive datasets on Russian ethno-nationalist 
violence available to the public. The consistency of their documentation and verification ensures 
that the relative number of instances/victims recorded each year serves to reflect overall rates of 
racist/nationalist violence, as well as the relative increases or decreases in rates of violence over 
time to a reasonable degree of accuracy. These datasets thus present a reasonable option for the 
purposes of comparing relative increases/decreases in nationalist violence against measures of 
the relative popularity of “state-nationalism” vs “ethno-nationalism”—albeit taking care to 
address those possible inconsistencies which could skew the analysis. 




The SOVA Center database on state suppression does not face the same issues as the 
database on violence, due to the fact that this data is compiled from the Russian government’s 
own prosecution/conviction records. SOVA Center qualifies which prosecutions/sentences are 
for acts of racist violence by identifying those cases where offenders were prosecuted under 
various articles of the criminal code which “contain a hate motive as an aggravating 
circumstance”.63 The database on state suppression is therefore an accurate record of all 
sentences passed by the Russian government for various racist/hate crimes, and offers a reliable 
metric for observing state suppression of ethno-nationalist violence. 
Measuring state and ethno-nationalism is somewhat less straightforward than measuring 
violence—both “ethno-nationalism” and “state-nationalism” are somewhat broad concepts 
referring to the various ideologies, opinions, political stances, and sentiments which shape one’s 
concept of national identity. There is no single “ethno-nationalist” political party or organization 
which competes at the poll with an opposing “state-nationalist” party, by which we could 
measure the contest between the two. Instead, we must rely primarily on polling results which 
measures data that we can identify or associate with “ethno-nationalism” and “state-nationalism” 
respectively. By comparing these measures to our “violence metrics”, we can identify common 
trends and extrapolate relationships which help us identify the role of violence within nationalist 
contest.  
Levada-Center, another Moscow based, non-governmental research organization 
conducts regular public opinion polls covering a wide range of subjects—including 
measurements which reflect both “ethno-nationalist” and “state-nationalist” opinions, sentiments, 




and popularity. The specific polls chosen for this analysis were those which measured opinions 
associated with ethno-nationalism, state-nationalism, and violence, and did so on a sufficient 
scale during approximately the same time period as the aforementioned SOVA Center data 
(approximately 2007-2018; however certain polls/data are included which slightly deviate from 
this timeline e.g. 2005-2017). All of the data on violence, ethno-nationalism, and state-
nationalism has been compiled into a series of graphs, which in turn have been organized by 
subject into three separate groups (and corresponding appendices). Figures 1.1 through 1.3 in 
Appendix 1 cover metrics of violence, figures 2.1 through 2.6 in Appendix 2 cover measures of 
state-nationalism, and figures 3.1 through 3.7 in Appendix 3 cover measures of ethno-
nationalism. The following section introduces and describes the figures which can be found in 
the Appendices (beginning on page 65).  
Data Descriptions 
Figure 1.1 “Total Ethnic/Nationalist Violence” & Figure 1.2 “Ethnic/Nationalist Violence – 
Victim Origin/Type” (Appendix 1, pg. 65) – These figures are derived from the same set of data 
(the SOVA Center dataset on ethnic/nationalist violence). Figure 1.1 shows only the total levels 
of violence in each year for the purposes of visual simplicity and easier comparison to other 
graphs, while Figure 1.2 provides an in-depth chart which breaks down the background of the 
victims targeted in the attacks. The SOVA Center data on violence includes certain categories of 
victims which have been excluded from our analysis as being non-pertinent to “ethno-nationalist 
violence”: these excluded categories include Homeless, LGBT, Youth Groups & Left, and 
Russian. This was done in order to focus on violence directed against the core ethno-nationalist 
“target groups” i.e. non-Russian ethnic and non-Orthodox religious minorities. These figures 
serve as our primary measures of violence. 
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Figure 1.3 “State Suppression – Sentences for Crimes” (Appendix 1, pg. 66) – This figure 
displays SOVA Center data on state sentencing for racial violence and against ethno-nationalist 
organizations and individuals. It serves as our measure for state suppression of ethno-nationalist 
actors. 
Figure 2.1 “Leadership Approval Ratings (Yearly Averages)” (Appendix 2, pg. 67) – This figure 
shows public approval ratings of Putin and the Russian government between 2007-2018. While 
approval ratings are not a direct measure of state-nationalism per se, they still provide valuable 
metrics for comparison in this analysis. This is particularly due to the fact that the factors which 
have affected approval ratings in recent years are common to those which have reshaped the 
contest between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism in Russia—namely the 2014 annexation 
of Crimea and subsequent confrontation with the West. While approval ratings of Putin have 
consistently been higher than the government as a whole (to be expected, as Russians associate 
negatives such as corruption and incompetence more with the rest of the government than with 
Putin specifically) the ratings of both mirror each other in their growth and decline, therefore we 
can use this as a metric for approval towards the Russian state as a whole. 
Figure 2.2 “Russian Pride” (Appendix 2, pg. 67) – This figure measures public response to polls 
which asked Russians, “are you currently proud of Russia?” and “are you proud to live in 
Russia?” Given that these questions measure national pride without being related to questions of 
Russian ethnicity, they serve as a useful measure of state-nationalism. 
Figure 2.3 “What is Patriotism?” (Appendix 2, pg. 68) – In this figure we see polling responses 
to the question “what does it mean to be a patriot?” Respondents were allowed to pick multiple 
answers. While itself not directly measuring levels of patriotism (and regrettably being polled 
somewhat inconsistently between 2007-2013), certain responses within this survey (such as “to 
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love one’s country”) provide valuable information about general feelings of patriotism in Russia 
during the years surveyed. 
Figure 2.4 “Perception that Russia currently has enemies” (Appendix 2, pg. 68) – This figure 
measures the percentage of respondents who replied affirmatively to the question, “In your 
opinion, does Russia have any enemies today?” It serves as a measure of public perception 
regarding foreign threats. 
Figure 2.5 “Positive Attitude towards the West” (Appendix 2, pg. 69) – This figure measures the 
percentage of respondents who replied that they had a positive attitude towards the United States 
and the European Union, respectively. The Russian state has notably oriented the state-
nationalist platform in opposition to “the West” in recent years, and this data provides a valuable 
observation of how Russian public opinion has responded. 
Figure 2.6 “Unfriendly/Hostile to Russia” (Appendix 2, pg. 69) – This figure measures the 
percentage of respondents who selected either Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, or “none” when asked 
to list the five countries they perceived to be the most hostile/unfriendly to Russia. Poland and 
Lithuania are two of the most significant NATO member-states bordering Russia, and have often 
had contentious relations with the Russian government. Measuring attitudes towards Ukraine 
serves as a valuable observation on changes in Russian public opinion following the events of 
Crimea and the conflict in Donbas.  
Figure 3.1 “Ethnic Russian Exceptionalism” (Appendix 3, pg. 70) – This figure measures 
polling responses of russkii ethnic Russians when asked to select which of the following 
sentiments they agreed with the most: “(Ethnic) Russians are a great, chosen people with a 
special role in world history” or “(Ethnic) Russians are a people just like others.” This question 
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was only polled on four separate occasions: 1992, 1999, 2016, and 2017. Figure 3.1 was 
introduced previously in the history/literature analysis, and while not covering the 2007-2018 
timeline, it establishes the emergence of Russian ethno-nationalism as a popular social and 
political force during the 1990s, and into the 2000s. 
Figure 3.2 “Opinion of ‘Russia for Russians’?” (Appendix 3, pg. 70) – This figure measures 
respondent opinions on the concept “Russia for Russians”. “Russia for Russians” is a pro-russkii 
ethno-nationalist political slogan and doctrine, espousing xenophobic positions ranging from 
support for exclusive privileges for ethnic Russians, to the wholescale expulsion of all ethnic 
minorities from the Russian Federation. Whereas other figures might only provide measures of 
ethno-nationalist sentiments, this figure provides a reliable metric for measuring outright support 
for ethno-nationalist platforms/ideology. 
Figure 3.3 “Perception of local interethnic tension” (Appendix 3, pg. 71) – This figure measures 
responses to the question, “Do you feel like there is inter-ethnic tension in the city/region where 
you currently live?” It provides a valuable measure of the “real” levels of ethnic tension directly 
experienced by Russians, as opposed to simply their perspectives of the general state of inter-
ethnic relations across the country. This distinction is important, as perspectives of general inter-
ethnic relations/tensions are strongly influenced by dominant/popular narratives in the media and 
public discourse rather than the direct, daily experiences of the population. 
Figure 3.4 “Support for Govt. limits/restrictions on influx of immigrants” (Appendix 3, pg. 71) – 
This figure measures support for the government instituting greater restrictions/limitations on 
immigration. When questioned as to their position on immigration, respondents were asked to 
pick between one of two statements: “The government should introduce new barriers and 
restrictions to limit the influx of immigrants,” or “There shouldn’t be new barriers to 
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immigration, we should use immigration to improve the state of Russia.” This graph measures 
support for restrictions, and serves as a measure for xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment. 
Figure 3.5 “Ethnic Hostility” (Appendix 3, pg. 72) – This figure measures responses to two 
polling questions: “Do you currently feel hostility from other ethnicities?” and “Do you currently 
feel hostility toward other ethnicities?” 
Figure 3.6 “Are large-scale, violent interethnic clashes a possibility in Russia?” & Figure 3.7 
“Are large-scale, violent interethnic clashes a possibility where you live?” (Appendix 3, pg. 72; 
Appendix 3, pg. 73) – Figure 3.6 measures responses to the question, “Do you believe massive, 
bloody, interethnic clashes could currently occur in Russia?”, and Figure 3.7 measures responses 
to the question, “Do you believe massive, bloody, interethnic clashes could currently occur 
where you live?” 
Violence  
As we can see in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, ethnic/nationalist violence in Russia has overall 
been gradually declining since it peaked in 2008. For context on preceding levels of violence, in 
his analysis on Russian neo-Nazi violence from 2001-2009, Richard Arnold identified that ethnic 
violence began to grow during the early 2000s and peaked in Russia between 2007-200864. This 
decline was relatively gradual from 2008-2010, then saw its most dramatic drop (approximately 
50%) between 2010 and 2011. Ethnic violence continued to decline into 2012, however in 2013 
it rose again (to above 2011 levels). In 2014 ethnic violence had returned back down to 2012 
levels, and since 2014 ethnic violence in Russia has remained approximately stable—possibly 
seeing a slight decrease—at relatively low levels (compared to the levels of the past). The 
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increase in 2013 is of significant interest—why, amid an otherwise constant decrease in violence, 
did ethno-nationalist violence rise in 2013, and how does this compare to our metrics on state-
nationalism and ethno-nationalism? 
As we can see in Figure 1.3, state suppression of ethno-nationalist violence had been 
steadily increasing from 2007 to 2009, increasing significantly in 2010 where suppression of 
violence peaked (coinciding with the assassination of Moscow judge Eduard Chuvashov, and the 
subsequent introduction of harsh anti-extremist legislation). Suppression of violence saw a 
moderate decline in 2011, and then a significant drop in 2012 to approximately 2007 levels, 
further declining slightly in 2013, following which point sentencing for ethnic violence has 
remained stable (and relatively low). However, while the state campaign of prosecution against 
ethno-nationalist violence seems to have essentially ended by 2012, state suppression of ethno-
nationalist actors and ideology steadily grew after 2011, as seen in the constant growth of 
sentencing for crimes of ethno-nationalist propaganda, and the minor increases in “organization” 
sentencing. The rise in propaganda sentencing most likely reflects the shift in the contest 
between state-nationalism and ethno-nationalism into the ideological and political sphere, as the 
Kremlin adopted a strategy of comprehensive suppression of ethno-nationalist rhetoric and 
platforms which challenged the state-nationalist platform in the realm of public opinion. 
When comparing the data on violence to data on suppression, we can see that the state’s 
heightened campaign of violence suppression between 2008-2011 (which was also introduced in 
the historical analysis) seemingly accomplished what it set out to do—bring down the rampant 
levels of ethno-nationalist violence which had been growing unchecked throughout the 2000’s 
(as detailed in Arnold’s work on violence and seen in our own data for 2007-2008). This is in 
effect, a case of the Russian state reasserting its monopoly on violence through enforcement.  
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One must keep in mind that “suppression” as observed in our data would theoretically have a 
somewhat delayed effect—the data shows yearly totals for violence and sentencing rather than 
weekly or monthly changes, and furthermore sentences for violent crimes can obviously only be 
carried out after said crime was committed. Therefore, the effects of suppression of violent 
ethno-nationalist actors (such as imprisonment) would theoretically be reflected in the decline of 
actual levels of ethno-nationalist violence for the following year/years (as those actors are no 
longer willing or capable to commit violence following punitive action from the state) as 
opposed to being reflected immediately in levels of violence during the same year. We can see 
this in effect when comparing figures 1.3 and 1.1, where state suppression levels peak in 2010, 
and then we subsequently see the greatest yearly drop in levels of violence between 2010-2011. 
Likewise, the gradual decline in violence seen in 2009 and 2010 seems to reflect the similarly 
gradual increase in state suppression levels in 2008 and 2009, respectively.  
How then to explain the uptick in violence in 2013 however? Was it merely an anomaly, 
or does it reflect a genuine spike in the relative strength and popularity of Russian ethno-
nationalism that exceeded state efforts to suppress it? The following graphs on state-nationalism 
and ethno-nationalism seem to suggest the latter, and give valuable context on the events of 2014 
which succeeded (at least for now) in undermining this short-lived resurgence in strength of 
ethno-nationalism in Russia. 
State-nationalism 
 Measuring state-nationalism—or rather, it’s relative “strength” and popularity—is 
somewhat more complicated and indirect than measuring violence, or even ethno-nationalism. 
Because state-nationalism rarely defines itself in as exclusive or definitive terms to the public as 
ethno-nationalism, a clear distinction between affiliation with state-nationalism over ethno-
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nationalism is difficult to place for many. Some Russians wouldn’t even identify a distinct 
duality between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism—most refer to what we understand as 
russkii ethno-nationalism as simply “nationalism”, and state-nationalism only manifests itself in 
defined terms through rossiiskii and “patriotism”; the first having largely fallen out of favor and 
use since the 1990s, and the second being such an inherently inclusive term that most ethno-
nationalists would refer to themselves as patriots while simultaneously having an entirely unique, 
ethno-nationalist concept of what the term means. 65 Furthermore, pollsters rarely ask questions 
in the line of “Is loyalty to the state more important than loyalty to one’s ethnicity?”—and if 
there does in fact exist a poll which asks Russians “what does it mean to be Russian” then sadly 
this author was unable to find it. 
We can however observe a number of factors in order to measure the relative “strength” 
or popularity of state-nationalism in Russia. Although state-nationalism is relatively inclusive 
when it comes to ethnicity, it promotes a national identity which defines itself exclusively against 
other states. In much the same way that ethno-nationalism motivates opposition or hostility 
towards “internal others”, state-nationalism tends to motivate opposition or hostility towards 
“external others”. State-nationalism rallies public support by identifying and positioning itself 
against foreign opponents, and often seeks to justify (its version of) national unity and the state’s 
monopoly on violence by emphasizing the need to unify in the face of threats from abroad. In the 
case of Russia, Putin’s Kremlin has increasingly positioned itself, and the state-nationalist 
narrative, in opposition “the West” (i.e. the US, EU, and NATO). By combining these 
observations with measurements of “patriotism”, national pride, and public support for the 
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government, we can observe fluctuations in the popularity or “strength” of state-nationalism over 
time. 
In Figure 2.1, we can see that state approval ratings experienced a constant, steady 
decline from after 2008 until they reached their low-point in 2013. As was covered in Chapter 4, 
this was primarily a consequence of a flagging Russian economy in the wake of the 2008 global 
recession. Putin had built much of his public support around the economic growth which Russia 
experienced between 2000-2008, and continued failure to restart said growth year after year 
gradually eroded support for the regime. However, in 2014, approval ratings jumped back up to 
pre-recession levels, growing slightly in 2015, then remaining relatively stable through to 2017, 
until experiencing another noticeable decline in 2018. This reversal of fortunes in 2014 is of 
course a result of the 2014 annexation of Crimea following Ukraine’s “pro-Europe” Euromaidan 
revolution, which was widely supported by a majority of Russians.  
In Figure 2.2, we can see that overall levels of Russian pride varied relatively little 
between 2006-2010, albeit with a notable increase in national pride between 2006 and 2007. In 
the next available entry in 2013 however, we see that pride to live in Russia has dropped 
significantly (approximately 15%), and national pride has slightly decreased relative to previous 
levels. Given that we have a gap in the data for 2011 and 2012, we can’t be sure of how gradual 
or sudden this drop was, but we can safely assume that 2013 represented a low-point in Russian 
pride. Levels of both national pride and pride to live in Russia rebound in 2014, after which point 
they remain generally stable for the remainder of the timeline. In Figure 2.3, we see a similar 
trend with our responses regarding Russian patriotism (again keeping in mind the gaps in the 
data), where responses of “loving one’s country” are noticeably low in 2010 and 2013 relative to 
2007 and the post-Crimea years. Although 2013 does not differ particularly strong from 2010, it 
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should be noted that in 2013 fewer Russians seemed noticeably less eager to discuss patriotism 
in general, as all responses on the poll received less selections than in 2007, 2010, or after 2014. 
Clearly feelings of patriotism—one of the central tenants of Russia’s rossiiskii/derzhavnost state-
nationalism—were at a low point in 2013. 
Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 demonstrate one weakness in the appeal of state-nationalism 
during this time: the perceived lack of foreign threats or opposition. Despite fluctuating tension 
between the Putin administration and western leadership over a variety of geopolitical issues, 
prior to 2014 most Russians were not as exceedingly concerned about the supposed threat posed 
by the United States and its allies as their government was. Even during the 2008 Russo-
Georgian War, when Russia faced major criticism and opposition from the US and other 
members of NATO for its actions and tensions were high, Russian public opinion of western 
powers dropped only marginally—few saw greater reasons to fear the west as a genuine, 
existential threat to Russia at the time. As we can see in figure 2.5, the 2008 dip in public opinion 
of the US and the EU quickly re-stabilized, and in 2013 60% of Russians held a positive opinion 
of the EU, and 50% held a positive opinion of the US. Looking at figure 2.6, we see that in 2013 
a record low considered the neighboring states of Poland and Lithuania as being “hostile”. 
Negative opinions of Ukraine were likewise at a low-point in 2013, demonstrating how dramatic 
the turn in 2014 would prove to be. In fact, in 2013 a record high number of poll respondents—
just over 30%—either stated “there are none” or otherwise had difficulty listing any countries as 
being hostile to Russia.  
The inability of the Russian government to convince the public of external or foreign 
threats prior to 2014 hindered the relative popularity of the state-nationalist platform. While 
economics were at the core of growing public discontent, the lack of any popular “foreign 
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boogeymen” wouldn’t do the government any favors when it came to winning support through 
identity politics. Conversely, in 2014 we see an increase in the perception of foreign enemies 
(Figure 2.4), the number of Russians with positive attitudes of the West halved (Figure 2.5) and 
remain low into 2018, and Russians increasingly began to see Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland as 
national adversaries (Figure 2.6). The events of 2014 pitted Russia against Ukraine and “the 
West”, and this conflict clearly resonated with the Russian public and dramatically bolstered 
support for the state. 
Ethno-nationalism 
 Measuring the relative “strength” or popularity of Russian ethno-nationalism is somewhat 
more straightforward than measuring state-nationalism, and the data available is therefore all the 
more informative. While Russian ethno-nationalists belong to a number of different 
organizations and subscribe to a variety of political and ideological stances, the general 
principles, motivations, and sentiments of ethno-nationalism are relatively consistent—
particularly when it comes to the ways in which ethno-nationalism appeals to the broader public. 
Xenophobia, racism, ethnic tensions, and ethnic exceptionalism are all hallmarks of ethno-
nationalist ideology, and correlate strongly with the relative popularity and strength of ethno-
nationalism in a society.  
 As we see in figure 3.1, since the turn of the millennium Russian ethno-nationalist 
sentiments have remained consistently strong, providing an effective platform for ethno-
nationalist actors to appeal to the public and mobilize both support, and violence. The popularity 
of these sentiments is arguably the biggest reason why ethno-nationalism has posed such a threat 
to the Russian state not only in nationalist discourse, but also on the political stage. In a country 
where most political opposition to the state is generally not taken very seriously by the public, 
55 
 
ethno-nationalists have projected a greater degree of legitimacy to the ethnic Russian majority 
than many others in the political opposition. This is in large part because they challenge the 
Russian state on a contentious and popular issue which it would prefer was forgotten—
immigration and ethnic policy—seeing as how the Kremlin’s geopolitical objectives would 
potentially only lead to an even less “Russian Russia”. 
 In figure 3.2 we can see that a majority of respondents between 2007-2016 consistently 
indicated their support for the ethno-nationalist slogan/platform “Russians for Russia”. This 
general trend only saw 3 significant changes: a 10% increase in approval in 2013, a subsequent 
decline in 2014, and a first-time switch of general opinion in 2017. Figure 3.3 demonstrates 
similar changes: perceptions of local interethnic tensions remained consistently moderate across 
polls conducted between 2007-2012 (between 20-30% of respondents responding yes/strong 
yes), then they see a notable increase in 2013 (43% now yes/strong yes) and subsequent quick 
decline to previous levels in 2014, followed by a very gradual decrease in perceived tensions 
with a low-point in 2017 (12%). Note that both figures show the same “sudden” fluctuations in 
2013, the same year in which ethno-nationalist violence made a moderate rebound before 
dropping again in 2014.  
 Meanwhile figures 3.4 and 3.5 both show a relatively long period of heightening ethnic 
tensions and growing xenophobia in Russia beginning as far back as 2009, reaching heights in 
2013. Support for immigration restrictions as seen in figure 3.4 had been gradually growing from 
2008 (perceived competition from immigrants over jobs during the economic downturn no doubt 
encouraging this trend) to 2013. Reported feelings of hostility both from and towards other 
ethnicities as seen in figure 3.5 had reached comparatively high levels in 2010, remaining so 
(approx. 20% hostile to other ethnicities) into 2013. In both figures we see a moderate decline in 
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2014, following which there is some degree of variation but overall sentiments trend towards 
either stable or decreasing levels. As with figures 3.2 and 3.3, 2013-2014 clearly represents a 
period of significant changes for the public’s relationship with ethno-nationalism, and it appears 
that despite ethno-nationalist sentiments being at record highs in 2013, the events of 2014 took 
the “wind out of the sails”.  
 Figures 3.6 and 3.7 cover data relating to one of the factors behind the 2013 increase in 
violence—race riots. In figures 3.6 and 3.6 we see that fears/concerns regarding the likelihood of 
large ethnic clashes which had been at a low point in November 2009 had jumped significantly 
by January 2011, declined by the end of the year, grew slightly the year after (2012) before 
seeing another significant jump in October of 2013. Clearly there had been events in 2010 and 
2013 which precipitated these jumps, and each case concerned large, well-publicized ethno-
nationalist race riots in Moscow. In December 2010, several thousand young men affiliated with 
both right-wing ethno-nationalist and “soccer fan” groups gathered in Moscow’s Manezhnaya 
Square to protest the death of a Russian soccer fan who had died in a clash involving a group of 
migrant Dagestani soccer fans. The protest spilled over into ethnic clashes between groups of 
young ethno-nationalists and minorities, and further targeted violence against minorities over the 
next several days.66 In October of 2013 an even more highly publicized riot took place in 
Biryulyovo, a working-class district in southern Moscow which is populated by a heavy mix of 
ethnic Russians and migrants—also initiated over a murder, that of young Russian man who had 
been stabbed to death in an altercation with a migrant from Azerbaijan. In the case of 
Biryulyovo, what had begun as a peaceful protest by locals demanding justice was eventually 
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sparked into a full-blown riot when a group of ethno-nationalist agitators began chanting racist 
slogans, smashing windows, and—after the crowd had swelled to several thousand—raiding a 
nearby shopping center as well as a nearby warehouse which employed Central Asian migrant 
workers. Although a number of attacks were committed by youths against passersby who they 
took for non-Russians, most injuries resulted from rioters clashing with the police, and a total of 
23 injuries were recorded resulting from the riot.67  
While these riots were significant sources of ethno-nationalist violence, they cannot 
singlehandedly account for the higher levels of violence seen in 2010 and 2013—for one, 
violence in 2010 was actually lower than it had been the previous year (where there had been no 
major ethno-nationalist riots), and furthermore ethno-nationalist violence in 2013 (as recorded by 
SOVA Center) had increased by more than simply 20 or 30 victims over 2012 levels (Figure 
1.2—SOVA Center recorded 139 victims of ethno-nationalist violence in 2012, vs 229 victims in 
2013). It bears reiterating that the SOVA Center data on violence does not successfully capture 
the real number of victims in a given year but rather better reflects the rates of violence, therefore 
when comparing 2012 to 2013 what we see is a 65% increase in violence—something that is 
unlikely to be entirely attributable to one Moscow riot. The significance of these riots—
particularly the 2013 Biryulyovo riot, was that that they demonstrated “boil-over” events of 
ethno-nationalist violence. As opposed to individual acts of violence which exclusively targets 
minority groups, these riots represented dissatisfaction with the state itself, and were direct 
confrontations with its authority. In his article on the Biryulyovo riot, Sean Guillory from the 
University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies argued that the riot 
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2019. https://www.thenation.com/article/how-russian-nationalism-fuels-race-riots/  
58 
 
should be seen primarily as a protest against the “multiethnic state”, led by ethno-nationalists but 
critically supported by many local residents. To quote the article: 
“Through the hatred for the migrant, the riots represent a political demand that Putin’s 
state represent them as Russians against non-Russians…”68 
Guillory emphasizes that the riot—while sparked and fueled by ethno-nationalist issues, was 
primarily a form of confrontation against the state, writing: 
“The crowd’s ire wasn’t only directed against non-Russians. Residents of Biryulyovo 
explained their rioting as a reaction to ‘the complacency and corruption of local 
officials.’…Shcherbakov’s murder concentrated locals’ ethnic hatred and hurled it at the 
police and the state.”69 
Consequentially, the riots were seen in a remarkably positive light by much of the Russian 
public. The fact that “average Russians” were involved limited the reaction of state law 
enforcement, who reacted in what many observers remarked was a somewhat “soft-handed” 
manner—the state did not want to promote the appearance that it was attacking “ordinary 
Russians” while defending migrants, especially since the riot had originated in a Russian dying 
at the hands of a migrant. 
That greater levels of ethno-nationalist violence would accompany a growth in the 
popularity of ethno-nationalist sentiments and ideologies is, on its own, not that remarkable an 
observation. However, what we see here is evidence that violence—and the ownership of 
violence—is not merely a side-effect, symptom, or consequence of popular ethno-nationalism, 
but rather that it can become inherently tied into the contest between ethno-nationalism and state-
nationalism itself. The willingness of ethno-nationalists to confront the state head-on and force a 






public contest against the state’s legitimacy in both the political (e.g. the 6,000-strong march in 
opposition to the regime on National Unity Day in November of 201270) and violence spheres 
could arguably have helped serve to promote the ethno-nationalist platform as a viable and 
legitimate alternative to the state-nationalist platform of the regime.  
It is somewhat implied that political actors who are able to motivate or lead members of 
the public to commit violence elicit some degree of authority or legitimacy over those followers, 
but to be responsible for instigating violent challenges to the state itself heavily implies a 
significant public preference for ethno-nationalism over the status-quo offered by the state. What 
is clear is that by 2013, ethno-nationalists had become a serious political threat to the Putin 
regime, one which it could no longer afford to avoid, or address solely through suppression of 
violence. The Kremlin would have to address the popularity of ethno-nationalism itself—given 
how prevalent ethno-nationalist aligning-sentiments were with the Russian public, discrediting 
the ideology would prove difficult. Instead, it would have to sell its own alternative of state-
nationalism, which it would accomplish in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea.  
Summary 
 There are several general observations that are immediately apparent when comparing 
and analyzing these figures. Firstly, the dramatic decline in ethno-nationalist violence between 
2008-2012 did not particularly correlate with a corresponding decline in ethno-nationalist 
sentiment or popularity with the public. Rather, it appears to have primarily reflected the impact 
of a heightened period of state suppression of ethno-nationalist violence from 2009-2011. Ethno-
nationalist popularity appears to have either remained strong or even grown slightly in the years 
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leading up to 2014. Conversely, measures of state-nationalist popularity with the public 
demonstrate a seemingly tepid reception prior to 2014, and approval ratings for Putin and the 
Russian government experienced a steady decline between 2008 to 2013. Thus, we can infer that 
while the campaign of suppression proved effective in combatting ethno-nationalist violence, it 
failed to deliver any victories against ethno-nationalism in the political sphere—nor bolster state-
nationalist ideology. Subsequently, the Russian state had no ideological substitute for the 
economic growth on which it had built its pre-2008 popularity, and suffered declining levels of 
public support and growing political discontent as a result. 
 The uptick in violence seen in 2013 occurred amid both a low-point in public support for 
the state and its approach to nationalism, and a high-point in ethno-nationalist sentiments, 
support, and activity. This uptick in violence was neither accompanied nor followed by an 
increase in state suppression, and indeed one factor which seems to have at least partially 
contributed was that state suppression had dropped back down to low levels—i.e. another 
“vacuum” of state enforcement a la that which existed prior to 2008. One possible explanation 
for this is that as opposed to earlier increases in ethno-nationalist violence, the failure of the state 
to meet violence in 2013 with suppression was due to the fact that this violence was “more 
political” than violence of the past. Essentially, this violence represented a more direct political 
challenge by ethno-nationalists against an increasingly unpopular state, typified by riots and 
protests, and accompanied with non-violent marches and demonstrations.  
 However, whereas state suppression of violence seems to have been primarily responsible 
for the decline in violence after 2008 via direct confrontation, the reversal of 2013 appears to 
have been accomplished “indirectly” through the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine/Crimea. Although 
state suppression of ethno-nationalist “propaganda” increased in 2013, it seems clear from the 
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data that the Russian government chose not to respond to the “surge” (for lack of a better term) 
in violence directly for fear of political backlash—it’s popularity was at an all-time low and 
ethno-nationalist sentiments and popularity among the public were running high. “Picking 
fights” against popular platforms from a position of relative weakness has the potential to 
seriously backfire for any regime, a lesson the Kremlin would have learned all too well from 
observing the results of any number of popular “revolutions” in the 21st century.  
Rather, ethno-nationalist violence seems to have fallen in 2014 because the general 
popularity of ethno-nationalist ideology declined following the annexation of Crimea. This 
coincided with a significant increase in the “strength” of state-nationalism: feelings of patriotism 
and pride increased, and the Russian public quickly recognized—and it could be argued, 
prioritized—foreign “threats” (the West) instead of internal ethnic “threats” (migrants, 
minorities). The annexation of Crimea had harnessed and played into “nationalist” sentiments in 
the Russian public, but not explicitly ethno-nationalist sentiments. To repeat from Chapter 4, it 
did not address the primary ethno-nationalist “questions” regarding Central Asian and Caucasian 
migrants, and it involved conflict with another East Slavic nation which was ostensibly an ethnic 
“ally” and “little brother” to the Russian people, and therefore opposed by many ethno-
nationalists. Yet this action appears to have succeeded in weakening the ethno-nationalist 
position, including public opposition to migrants and ethnic minorities without actually directly 
addressing it. Given that the annexation of Crimea had very little to do with the issues of Central 
Asian or Caucasian migration, and that in 2014 Russia issued the highest number of employment 
permits to foreign workers in its history71, we can reasonably assume that the boost in popularity 
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for the Kremlin’s state-nationalism platform did in fact weaken and pull away support from the 
ethno-nationalist opposition. Not only is this further evidence of the “zero-sum” nature of the 
contest between competing nationalisms, it highlights the extent to which violence can be 
observed to reflect/correlate with the political contest over nationalism.  
What we can infer from the dynamics observed in these comparisons is that violence and 
the monopoly on violence, while clearly being subject to very heavy influence by the relative 
degree of state suppression/enforcement, are not solely determined or generated by such and are 
in fact affected by and correlate with the contest of competing nationalisms. The data seems to 
support the idea that, while high/increasing popularity of ethno-nationalism do not guarantee 
high levels of ethno-nationalist violence, high/increasing levels of ethno-nationalist violence 
require or are predicated upon high popularity for ethno-nationalism. Whether or not—or to what 
extent—popular ethno-nationalism manifests itself in significant levels of ethno-nationalist 
violence appears to be significantly determined by the degree of state suppression, and in this 
sense, violence appears to have a decidedly “symptomatic” relationship with popularity and 
suppression. Suppression thus theoretically serves as a strategy whereby the state can directly 
address ethno-nationalist violence as a symptom of its popularity, without addressing its 
“source” i.e. popular ethno-nationalist politics. Conversely, by addressing nationalist ideology 
itself (namely by establishing and popularizing its own alternatives to ethno-nationalism), the 
state can undermine and weaken rates of ethno-nationalist violence without suppression—
thereby “treating the source”, so-to-speak. Furthermore, violence can also be seen as having a 
“symptomatic” relationship with nationalism in that it can change to reflect the contest between 
ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism—when the contest turns to more direct confrontation, 
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the associated violence can appear to become “more political” and geared in opposition to the 
state.  
Ultimately, in comparing our figures on violence, state-nationalism, and ethno-
nationalism, we were presented with several plausible examples of how violence both correlates 
with and reflects contests between competing ethno-nationalist and state-nationalist platforms in 
Russia. While there are a number of extenuating factors which clearly impact levels of violence 
and the political discourse surrounding nationalism (such as the major role played by economic 
factors), there is sufficient evidence of correlation between violence and the fluctuation between 
ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism that it can be considered indicative of a relationship. 
These examples appear to support the hypothesis that nationalism serves to mediate a 
relationship between national identity, the state, and violence, as opposed to simply national 
identity and the state. The implications of this suggest that future analyses of nationalist 
narratives and nationalist contests should strive to incorporate observations on nationalist 
violence, and that measuring the use and control of violence is critical to understanding the role 











In analyzing the case of nationalist contest in contemporary Russia, we demonstrate how 
changes in popularity between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism correlated with the use or 
“control” of violence between ethno-nationalists and the state. The historical analysis of Russian 
nationalism establishes the basis of this nationalist contest, wherein Russian ethno-nationalism is 
in large part a reflection of popular discontent and opposition to the state and its position on 
Russian national identity. This fits into the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, 
wherein we propose that ethno-nationalism reflects “bottom-up” pressures against the state, 
while state-nationalism reflects “top-down” nationalist pressures onto the nation. Rises in the 
popularity of ethno-nationalism in Russia since 2007 have been associated with a decline in state 
popularity; and in the absence of state suppression, violence. Conversely, the rise in popularity of 
state-nationalism in 2014 was not only associated with decreased popularity of ethno-nationalism 
and an ethnic-based national identity, but also correlated with a lasting decline in ethno-
nationalist violence without necessitating direct suppression of said violence. The Russian state’s 
campaign of suppression from 2008-2011 succeeded in lowering rates of violence, however this 
did not permanently address the core issue of public support for ethno-nationalism, which as we 
see was largely responsible for a moderate resurgence in levels of ethno-nationalist violence in 
2013. With the invigoration of the state-nationalist narrative and platform during the events of 
2014 we see a lasting decline in both ethno-nationalist support and ethno-nationalist violence. 
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This analysis of Russian nationalism suggests a relationship between nationalism and violence, 
as the use of violence reflected or correlated with fluctuations we observed in the competition 
between ethno-nationalism and state-nationalism in contemporary Russia. 
66 
 
APPENDIX 1 – VIOLENCE FIGURES 
*Hyperlink in name links to the description of the figure given in Chapter 5. 
Figure 1.1: "Total Ethnic/Nationalist Violence". SOVA Center.72
 
Figure 1.2: "Ethnic/Nationalist Violence - Victim Origin/Type". SOVA Center.73 
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APPENDIX 2 – STATE-NATIONALISM FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: “Leadership Approval Ratings”. Levada-Center.75 
 
Figure 2.2: “Russian Pride”. Levada-Center.76 
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Figure 2.3: “What is Patriotism?”. Levada-Center.77 
 
Figure 2.4: “Perception that Russia currently has enemies.” Levada-Center.78 
 
                                                          
https://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/OM-2017.pdf. Data gathered from Table 3.1.4, p. 30 and 
Table 3.7, p. 29. 
 
77 Ibid. Data gathered from Table 3.1.17, p. 36. 
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Figure 2.5: “Positive Attitude towards the West.”. Levada-Center.79 
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APPENDIX 3 – ETHNO-NATIONALISM FIGURES 
Figure 3.1: “Ethnic Russian Exceptionalism”. Levada-Center.81 
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Understanding"." Levada-Center, Public Opinions 2017, 2018. Accessed January 22, 2019. 
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Figure 3.2: “Opinion of ‘Russia for Russians’?”. Levada-Center.82 
 
Figure 3.3: "Perception of local interethnic tension". Levada-Center.83 
 
                                                          
82 Ibid. Data gathered from Table 20.16, p. 174. 
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Figure 3.4: "Support for Govt. limits/restrictions on influx of immigrants". Levada-Center.84 
 
Figure 3.5: “Ethnic Hostility”. Levada-Center.85 
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Figure 3.6: “Are large-scale, violent interethnic clashes a possibility in Russia?” Levada-
Center.86 
 
Figure 3.7: “Are large-scale, violent interethnic clashes a possibility where you live?” Levada-
Center.87 
 
                                                          
86 Ibid. Data gathered from Table 20.4, p. 170. 
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